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Abstract 
 
Although two decades of militarization have normalized the presence of armed forces 
in eastern DR Congo, civilians continue to resist their power and practices, engaging 
in heterogeneous repertoires of contentious action. Focusing on resistance against the 
national army, this article analyzes the forms and effects of these contentious 
repertoires as well as the factors that shape them. The latter include the intimate and 
multi-faceted entanglement of civilian and military lives and the high fluidity of 
dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection. These factors foster an orientation 
towards both the socially immediate and the socially imagined.  Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to analyze civilian resistance in eastern DR Congo through the lens of 
Òsocial navigation,Ó a term used to conceptualize social practice in volatile settings. 
Yet social navigationÕs focus on fluidity and flexibility does not allow for fully 
comprehending civiliansÕ contentious practices vis--vis the military. Following the 
theory of structuration, these practices are also shaped by relatively durable social 
structures, such as economic scarcity and deeply rooted socio-political imaginaries 
and modes of action relating to Òstateness,Ó patronage, and social belonging. The 
imprint of these structures on social practice renders civilian resistance fleeting, 
incoherent, and personalized, thereby reducing its potential to undermine the 
militaryÕs dominance. These observations indicate that even in highly volatile 
settings, the analysis of durable social structures remains crucial to understanding 
social practice, including resistance, and its effects on the social order. The analytical 
approach of social navigation must therefore be complemented by the theory of 
structuration.  
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One morning, the Congolese manager of a field base of an international relief 
organization located in war-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo got a 
big scare. When looking out of the window, he saw officers of the Congolese army, 
the Forces Armes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed 
Forces of the DR Congo), approaching his base. Oftentimes, the arrival of FARDC 
officers heralded trouble, in particular when the army was engaged in operations 
against rebel groups, as was currently the case. The officers told him that they lacked 
the means to rapidly transport a cargo of ammunition to troops deployed at the 
frontlines. Since he had several cars provided by his employer, a western-financed 
non-governmental organization (NGO), he should help them transport the 
ammunition. He had to do this, they emphasized, to fulfill his Òpatriotic dutyÓ to assist 
the national armed forces. Overwhelmed and frightened, the base manager had 
contradictory feelings about how to handle this situation: On the one hand, he did not 
want to violate the humanitarian principles he had been taught by the headquarters of 
his organization, which prescribe neutrality and impartiality and prohibit the 
facilitation of any kind of armed activity. On the other hand, he had to maintain good 
relations with the FARDC brigade in his area of operations, since his NGO was 
working on a road rehabilitation project in an isolated and insecure area. During an 
interview at his base a few weeks after the incident, he proudly told me that to solve 
this dilemma, he initially accepted to transport the ammunition, but soon afterwards 
pretended that the engine of his car broke down. He then put up a whole performance 
of trying to fix the car, finally asking some young men to push it back to the base and 
offload the ammunition. This trick allowed him to respect the humanitarian principles 
while not endangering future operations by making enemies among the army.  
This anecdote illustrates howÑdespite the relative normalization of the 
presence of both state and non-state armed forces after over two decades of ongoing 
warfareÑcivilians in the eastern Congo continue to resist these forcesÕ position and 
practices. ÒCiviliansÓ are commonly defined as Òthose who are not full-time members 
of an armed groupÓ (Kalyvas 2006, 19). Yet it is an imprecise and relative category, 
the boundaries of which are contextual, porous and at times dissolve (Slim 2008). 
ÒResistanceÓ is understood herein in the sense of Scott (1985, 290), namely, as any 
social and speech acts of civilians that are intended either to mitigate or deny 
symbolic (e.g. respect) and material (e.g. taxes) claims placed upon them by members 
of the Congolese armed forces. Such acts assume different forms, hovering between 
official and non-official, public and private, legal and illegal, violent and non-violent, 
everyday and incidental. Despite this diversity, my study shows that there are clear 
Òcontentious repertoiresÓ (Tilly 1993), or recurring combinations of forms of 
resistance that emerge in particular conditions. In general, civilians in the eastern 
Congo engage more in individual, informal and non-public contentious action than in 
collective, public manifestations. Furthermore, they tend to engage in short-term, 
rather than continual contestation, often alternating resistance with collaboration.  
How can we explain these contentious repertoires? And what are their 
cumulative effects on the overall power position of the FARDC? A growing body of 
work draws on the concept of Òsocial navigationÓ to analyze social practice in volatile 
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and uncertain settings, like (post)conflict zones (e.g. Utas 2005; Vigh 2006). For Vigh 
(2009), the term social navigation expresses the idea that similar to vessels at sea, 
both social agents themselves and the very social environment in which they are 
situated are on the move. The resulting Òmotion within motionÓ draws attention to the 
Òradical interactivityÓ (Vigh 2009, 420) between social agents and the social 
formations in which they are situated. The hyper-volatility of the eastern CongoÕs 
socio-political order renders social navigation a pertinent approach to analyze civilian 
resistance to the military. As this contribution demonstrates, combined with the 
complex and intimate interweaving of military and civilian lives, this volatility elicits 
behavioral orientations typically associated with social navigation: on the one hand, a 
focus on short-term goals, like immediate safety and direct access to revenues; on the 
other hand, an effort to ensure a maximum of future possibilities, in particular by 
maintaining multiple networks of contacts.  
While the concept of social navigation thus provides considerable insight into 
how and when civilians resist the Congolese army, it does not suffice as an analytical 
tool. As further outlined below, the emphasis on radical interactivity tends to obscure 
the ways in which social practiceÐeven in situations of intense fluxÑis shaped by 
durable social structures. For Giddens (1984, 28), social structures are rules and 
resources constitutive of power relations, norms, and discourses (or structures of 
domination, legitimation and signification, respectively) that are reproduced over 
relatively long stretches of time. Like all social practice, civiliansÕ repertoires of 
contention vis--vis the military are imprinted by these structures. The most important 
of these are the general scarcity of income-generation opportunities in the Congo, and 
deeply rooted socio-political imaginaries and modes of action relating to patronage, 
ethnicity/autochthony, and Òstateness.Ó Following GiddensÕs (1984) theory of 
structuration, it is precisely by imprinting civiliansÕ everyday practices, including 
resistance to the military, that these social structures are produced and reproduced. 
Thus, structuration does not only help us understand how civilian resistance is shaped, 
it also provides insight into the effects of that resistance on the social order, 
specifically the militaryÕs position within that order. If social structures are not 
instantiated by social practice, the social order that they constitute will ultimately 
transform. As this article shows, the main social structures shaping civilian resistance 
to the military as outlined above render it fragmented and unstable, thereby reducing 
its potential to undermine the armed forcesÕ dominance. From these observations, we 
can conclude that to understand contentious repertoires and their long-term effects, 
attention to the mutual influences between durable social structures and social 
practice remains indispensable, even in situations of high flux and uncertainty.  
To make the case for the complementary relevance of social navigation and 
structuration, the article proceeds as follows.  It first outlines the main theoretical 
concepts drawn upon, and then provides a brief discussion of the used methods and 
the challenges I encountered during field research. The subsequent section describes 
the main social structures that shape civilian-military interaction, and how they set in 
motion self-enforcing dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection. The next part 
describes a number of recurring acts of civilian resistance against the military, 
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drawing on examples from the fieldwork. The forms and effects of these contentious 
repertoires are then analyzed in the light of the main social structures and dynamics 
identified to shape social practice in the eastern Congo. The concluding section 
discusses the theoretical implications of the articleÕs findings, arguing that when 
analyzing agency in volatile settings, a distinction must be made between fluid social 
dynamics and less fluid social structures, which jointly shape and are shaped by social 
practice.  
 
 
 
Social Navigation and Structuration  
 
The analytical approach of social navigation emerged from the observation that 
existing theories of social practice are ill suited to environments of high political, 
social and economic volatility and insecurity. For Vigh (2009), who has formulated 
the most comprehensive theorization of the concept of social navigation to date, this 
unsettledness induces a temporal orientation towards both the present and the future. 
Specifically, it causes social practice to be simultaneously informed by Òthe 
assessment of the dangers and possibilities of oneÕs present positionÓ and Òthe process 
of plotting and attempting to actualize routes into an uncertain and changeable futureÓ 
(Vigh 2009, 425). Thus, social navigation is movement Òthrough both the socially 
immediate and the socially imaginedÓ (2009, 425). As the wavering nature of the 
socially immediate prompts social agents to constantly adapt and attune their actions 
to the unfolding environment, understanding these actions requires an optic of 
Òradical interactivityÓ. Such an optic would offer Òan alternative perspective on 
practice and the intersection between agency, social forces and changeÓ (2009, 420).  
The notion of Òradical interactivity,Ó however, seems to undervalue the 
structuring effects of those features of social orders that tend to transform slowly, 
such as power relations and discursive formations. At the same time, it appears to 
overvalue the effects that social actors have on their environment, which the language 
of interactivity suggests are substantial. While Vigh acknowledges the relevance of 
relatively stable institutions amid social flux, he does not identify what these 
institutions are or the mechanisms by which they come to inform social practice. 
Rather, he invokes Òsocial forcesÓ and Òsocial environmentÓ as relatively unspecified 
concepts. In addition, he deems Òthe slow processes of sedimentation and habituationÓ 
(2009, 427) central to BourdieuÕs theory of practice to be of limited relevance in 
situations of hyperfluidity. Moreover, in spite of the emphasis on interactivity, the 
concept of social navigation does not account for how people come to influence the 
social environments that they navigateÐregardless of their own experience of control 
over that environment, which it foregrounds.  
Social navigationÕs relative neglect of durable social structures becomes 
apparent when comparing it to Emirbayer and MischeÕs (1998) conceptualization of 
agency. For Emirbayer and Mische, agency is constituted by a chordal triad with three 
dimensions that correspond to three different temporal orientations: past, future, and 
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present. Every instance of social practice is simultaneously informed by these three 
dimensions, albeit to differing degrees. The first dimension is iterative, referring to 
Òthe selective reactivation...of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely 
incorporated in practical activityÓ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 971). The second 
dimension is projective, denoting Òthe imaginative generation by actors of possible 
future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be 
creatively reconfiguredÓ (971). The third dimension is practical-evaluative, and 
relates to making Òpractical and normative judgments among alternative possible 
trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and 
ambiguities of presently evolving situationsÓ (971). Within this conceptualization of 
agency, social structures, in the form of past patterns of thought and action, are central 
to the iterative dimension, in particular via the mechanism of the schematization of 
social experience. But social structures also play a role in the practical-evaluative 
dimension, specifically via the Òcharacterization of a given situation against the 
background of past patterns of experienceÓ (997). Furthermore, although mostly 
future-oriented, the projective dimension is also informed by social structures, as it is 
linked to the past Òthrough a retrospective-prospective process of identification, in 
which possible trajectories are located against a backdrop of prior typifications from 
experienceÓ (988).  
This theoretical detour allows us to see that while social navigation 
foregrounds the projective and practical-evaluative dimensions of agency, it 
downplays the ways in which these are informed by past patterns of thought and 
action. At the same time, it pays limited attention to iterationÑroutines, in particular. 
However, when analyzing civilian resistance to the Congolese army, as further 
described below, the imprint of sedimented modes of thinking and acting can clearly 
be discerned. This imprint is accounted for by the theory of structuration, which states 
that structures are both the medium and outcome of social practices (Giddens 1984). 
Within their everyday practices, knowledgeable, situated social agents draw upon 
recursively organized sets of rules and resources (or social structures), thereby 
intentionally and unintentionally producing and reproducing them. That is not to say 
that social structures determine social practices. Rather, they shape them by both 
enabling and constraining certain paths of action. However, what path is followed is 
also the result of agency, which fashions the ways in and extent to which agents draw 
upon structures in their day-to-day conduct (Giddens 1984).  
 
 
Methods  
 
While embroiled in episodic turmoil for decades, only particular moments of violence 
in the eastern Congo have been bracketed as clearly identifiable Òwars.Ó Most 
recently, these moments concern the First (1996Ð1997) and Second (1998Ð2003) 
Congo Wars. The violence that has continued since is more difficult to fit into the 
meta-narrative of Òa war.Ó  At present, dozens of domestic and foreign armed groups 
of all shapes and sizes roam the countryside, in particular in the provinces of North 
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and South Kivu. These groups are the product of overlapping and fluctuating 
dynamics located at different scales. Therefore, their existence defies well-
circumscribed explanatory schemes. What many groups have in common is that they 
claim to engage in the defense of often ethnically defined communities, and are tied to 
these communities through complex webs of relations ranging from more to less 
coercive  (Verweijen 2016). In part to contain these groups, well over a third of the 
approximately 145,000 troops of the national armed forces (FARDC) are deployed to 
the Kivus. How do these various state and non-state forces interact with civilians at 
the micro level? And in what manners and why do civilians resist, collaborate or 
comply with this plethora of armed actors?  
To answer these questions, I conducted fourteen months of fieldwork between 
2010 and 2012, in stretches of four to five months per field trip. A series of shorter 
fieldtrips (two to four weeks) between 2013 and 2017, amounting to six months in 
total, helped consolidate the findings (for an extensive description of methods and 
methodology, see Verweijen 2015a). Data were gathered through a range of 
ethnographic methods, including informal conversations, semi-structured individual 
and group interviews, and observations (for instance of road block taxation, or of 
military involvement in civilian disputes). The research focused both on the FARDC 
and non-state armed groups. However, since the social embeddedness and modes of 
organization and operating of state and non-state armed forces were found to differ 
considerably, it was chosen to describe their interaction with civilians separately. This 
article focuses on civiliansÕ resistance against the national army
1
, but recognizes the 
influence of non-state armed forces where relevant. 
On the civilian side, I contacted interlocutors from different categories, 
including local authorities, civil society organizations, and members of diverse 
economic groups (e.g. farmers, fishermen, shop-keepers, and artisanal miners). Of 
each category, and where possible, both men and women were contacted. This gave 
rise to the observation that while gendered differences generally matter for how 
civilians engage with members of the armed forces (the overwhelming majority of 
whom are male), the effects of these differences are highly variable. Moreover, the 
effects of gender were often difficult to disaggregate from the effects of other factors, 
in particular differences in class, status, profession and political connections.  In many 
cases, these other factors appeared to shape civiliansÕ agency vis--vis the military 
more decisively than gender. Because gender could not be identified as having 
determining influence in a stand-alone manner in any of the forms of civilian 
resistance discussed herein, it does not figure as a separate explanatory factor. This 
absence should not be taken to indicate its irrelevance: Gendered differences did 
importantly shape forms of civilian resistance not analyzed in this article, as well as 
some of their effects. 
Given that neither military personnel nor civilians easily talk about particular 
aspects of their mutual relations, I had to build up networks of key informants and 
find research assistants who were locally well known and could therefore lower 
																																																								
1
	For civilian resistance against armed groups, see Suarez 2017	
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distrust during one-time interviews. Many of these one-off interactions took place in 
isolated rural areas, which tend to have significant army deployment and armed group 
presence. Due to high levels of insecurity, staying for a long time in one place in these 
areas is simply too dangerous. I therefore adopted a Òroving approach,Ó which meant 
that I was constantly on the move, going from village to village.  I mostly travelled by 
foot and by motorcycle, and occasionally by boat, accompanied by a research 
assistant. During the 2010Ð2012 research phase, transcripts and/or notes were made of 
conversations with 400 persons and 150 military personnel. However, I spoke with 
many more peopleÑfor instance during random encounters in the course of travel or 
in the cheap hotels where I stayed, which often lodged numerous FARDC officers.  
Travelling in isolated areas and adverse circumstancesÑmuddy and barely 
practicable roads, steep slopes in mountain areas, road axes with considerable ambush 
riskÑhelped me to make connections. Civilians and military alike were often 
surprised to see a muzungu (white person in Swahili, the lingua franca of the eastern 
Congo) in such far-flung areas, and many appreciated the effort I had taken to reach 
them. Most people were very helpful and hospitable, providing me with food and 
shelter, and helping me find particular key persons in the absence of phone network 
coverage. In most villages I was hosted by the village chief or in a local parish, and 
village elders often gathered in the evening to discuss with me. Occasionally, I was 
hosted by armed groups and the military, some members of which were surprisingly 
welcoming and collaborative. As in many other war zones (e.g. Wood 2006), they 
wanted their stories to be heard, and were willing to engage in lengthy exchanges.  
To reduce distrust and foster open exchange, I adopted a range of strategies: 
presenting myself explicitly as a mwanafunzi (student) without much power and 
resources, learning Swahili, and making jokes. I also told people much about my own 
life and ideas, to avoid a purely one-sided conversation, and often first asked 
extensively about local history and general topics before slowly moving towards more 
sensitive issues. Developing these strategies, in constant awareness of the discursive 
and power effects of my presence as a white Westerner, required Òhyper self-
reflexivityÓ (Kapoor 2004). I constantly had to keep an eye and reflect on what my 
presence ÒdidÓ in the research context and how it affected the discursive and social 
practices of both those Òbeing researched uponÓ and myself. For instance, mentioning 
a term like Òhuman rightsÓ among civilians could elicit confidential stories about 
military abuses; probably because, despite my identity as an academic researcher, 
many people still associated me with the Òhumanitarian intervention complexÓ and 
hoped I could somehow Òdo somethingÓ for them. Yet among military officers, it was 
best to avoid the vocabulary of human rights, since it seemingly transformed me into 
an agent of control that was moreover associated with the distrusted Òinternational 
communityÓ they accuse of plundering the CongoÕs rich resources. Dynamics of 
interaction were also importantly shaped by my real or perceived positioning towards 
the Congolese government. Among military and civilian interlocutors alike, dislike of 
the current government in Kinshasa was strong, and many people tried to elicit my 
opinion on their anti-government stance. Did I have to give in to these pressures to 
show I was Òon the right side,Ó and would this help me gain trust? Or did I have to 
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guard ÒneutralityÓ by staying Òout of politicsÓ? As I discovered, both positions were 
highly consequential for how conversations and relationships would unfold, and what 
type of information was conveyed.  
My roving approach in rural areas did not prevent me from meeting the same 
people numerous times. Not only did I often return to the same villages, I also 
continued to run into the same army personnel, as certain units rotated between the 
different areas where I conducted research. Furthermore, I became acquainted with 
numerous officers staying in the bigger towns where I generally spent longerÑup to 
ten daysÑto work on field notes, organize field trips to remote areas, and introduce 
myself to the local authorities and security services. Owing more to luck than to any 
well-conceived strategy, I managed to secure permission for my research from the 
army headquarters of the 8
th
 and 10
th
 Military Regions (North and South Kivu 
province, respectively). This was no more than a stamp on my ordre de mission 
[mission order], a document explaining who you are, what institute you are linked to, 
and the purpose of your travel. Such a document is indispensable when conducting 
research, as all authorities ask for it. But even more important than having the right 
stamps from the right authorities were good personal connections. I was able to build 
up relations with a number of key officials from the army, and the migration and 
civilian intelligence services, who seemed convinced of the importance of my 
research. To reduce their suspicion, I engaged with them proactively, visiting them 
frequently in their offices and at times their homes on my own initiative. Such 
engagement moreover allowed me to heavily direct our conversations. And by telling 
mostly what I chose to tell myself, I could generally avoid questions I did not want to 
answer (for instance about protected informants). Fortunately, none of these 
authorities ever saw a need to report me to their hierarchy as suspicious, and as long 
as they accepted my research, their subordinates in the rural areas had to do the same. 
 
 
The Social Structures and Dynamics Shaping Civilian-military Interaction 
 
One of the first things the first-time visitor to the Kivu provinces notices is the 
pervasiveness of the FARDC. Both in urban and rural settings, the sight of its 
camouflage fatigues is inescapable. Circulating on motorbikes or vehicles in town, 
loitering in the streets and at markets, riding overcrowded trucks and minibuses, or 
walking dilapidated roads toward their next site of deployment: the FARDC is 
seemingly omnipresent. Consequently, civilians frequently encounter soldiers in their 
everyday lives. These contacts are further promoted by the fact that a substantial part 
of the FARDC personnel deployed in the Kivus originate from the provinces 
themselves. Thus, they stay relatively close to social networks related to their life 
beyond the army. These networks sometimes also encompass armed groups. One 
reason for this is that many soldiers are former rebels who integrated into the 
FARDC, while some of their former comrades remained in or returned to the bush 
(Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2013).  
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What also fosters frequent civilian-military interactions is that the FARDC 
resembles less a Òtotal institutionÓ (Goffman 1961) than some other militaries 
(Verweijen 2018). It is not a relatively closed, self-contained social order with its own 
facilities and logistics, where all aspects of social life are shaped by the military 
hierarchy and unfold in the co-presence of colleagues. Due to the insufficiency and 
unattractiveness of barracks, many FARDC soldiers rent rooms or houses from 
civilians, living intermingled with the population. Moreover, numerous soldiers have 
wives, girlfriends and children in the Kivus, which further embeds them in civilian 
networks. FARDC personnel also encounter civilians when arranging basic 
necessities like transport and medical care, which are not provided by the military 
organization. Additionally, many soldiers are engaged in different types of revenue 
generation among civilians, like petty trade, charcoal production, and ÒtaxationÓ at 
roadblocks, markets, beaches and mining sites (Verweijen 2013). 
Owing to civiliansÕ and military personnelÕs shared living and socio-economic 
space, there are not two well-delineated ÒcivilianÓ and ÒmilitaryÓ spheres.  The same 
applies to the military sphere of armed groups, which are similarly closely embedded 
in civilian social networks (Verweijen 2015b, 2016). What further weakens the 
boundaries between the ÒmilitaryÓ and ÒciviliansÓ is that these notions constitute 
superordinate (or umbrella) identity categories that are not always salient in everyday 
situations (Slim 2008). ÒSoldiersÓ and ÒciviliansÓ enact many different social roles, 
often simultaneously, and therefore do not always see and define each other in these 
respective terms. Instead, they may regard each other as relatives, neighbors, 
suppliers, clients, lovers, protectors, co-religionists, business partners, traitors, or 
ethnic in-or out-group members. Furthermore, Òthe Congolese armed forcesÓ is far 
from a homogeneous group, encompassing people from various origins and a wide 
range of classes, with the rank-and-file belonging to the poorest segments of 
Congolese society and the top leadership to the richest. 
The diversity of social roles enacted by military and civilians reflects their 
entanglement in social webs that span all dimensions of life. These webs crosscut 
ÒpublicÓ and ÒprivateÓ spheres, meaning that neither is well delineated. This 
blurriness stems in part from the salience of patronage networks, which are marked by 
personalized power relations and generally encompass both state and non-state actors, 
and both military and civilians (Bayart 2006). The result is a social constellation 
where the relations between dominant and dominated are more characterized by 
domesticity and intimacy, or what Mbembe (1992, 10) calls Òconviviality,Ó than by 
binary opposites, like civil society vs. state, or subjection vs. autonomy. However, 
intimacy and proximity do not exclude coercion and distance. Civilians do not know 
every soldier in the FARDC, and there are many situations where soldiers perform 
primarily a military-coercive role. Clearly, this affects the possibilities for and 
expressions of resistance. 
To understand civilian resistance to the military, it is necessary to grasp what 
social roles are salient within civilian-military interaction in general, and how these 
roles are constituted. The concept of social role foregrounds performativity and 
situatedness (Goffman 1959). However, the performance of social roles is scripted by 
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social categorizations, or typifications, that are constituted by particular 
configurations of discourses, norms and power relations (cf. Giddens 1984).
2
 These 
configurations cause social categories, and the social roles they shape, to be 
surrounded by predefined meanings and (normative) expectations concerning 
obligations, prerogatives and social practices. During my field research I found that 
the main social categories drawn upon within civilian-military interaction in the Kivus 
are: first, the category of ÒpatronÓ and relatedly Òclient;Ó second, that of Òstate actor,Ó 
which is inscribed in heterogeneous associative fields relating to ÒstatenessÓ (cf. 
Hansen and Stepputat 2001); and third, the category of Òthe (ethnic/autochthon) 
Other.Ó Each of these categories relates to sedimented socio-political imaginaries and 
modes of action, hence durable social structures.  
Within the Congo, patronage networksÑwhich overlap and intersect with 
other social ties, like family, ethnic, and professional backgroundÑhave elevated 
significance in political and socio-economic life. They are deeply inscribed in the 
Òmoral matrixÓ surrounding authority (Schatzberg 1988, 73), and permeate the state 
apparatus, including the armed forces, where they intersect and conflict with the 
formal hierarchy and rules (Verweijen 2018). This permeation is one of the root 
causes of the arbitrary and deficient workings of the state apparatus (Bayart 2006). 
Not only does the state offer limited social services and security, it is often a source of 
insecurity itself, engaging, for instance, in arbitrary arrests, extortion, or the sudden 
withdrawal of permits (Trefon 2009). Insecurity and the stateÕs lack of service 
provision, in turn, incentivize people to solicit patronage networks for help. This 
tendency is exacerbated by the workings of the economy. Revenue-generation 
opportunities are scarce, and access to them is politically mediated. Thus, to get jobs, 
loans, permits, trade partners and sometimes customers, people need help from a 
patron.  
As mentioned, FARDC personnel are part of the same patronage networks as 
civilians, with especially high-ranking officers serving as important patrons to 
civilians. For civilians, entering into patronage ties with military figures is particularly 
attractive given the multi-faceted insecurity that reigns in the Kivus. FARDC officers 
can mobilize coercion, have economic power and political connections and can 
influence the state apparatus; hence, they can mitigate the insecurity that it causes. 
These capacities enable officers-cum-patrons to provide their clients powerful forms 
of Òprotection,Ó like intimidating opponents, securing property, and influence-
peddling among other state agents. In exchange, clients grant these officers loyalty, 
information, and resources, which are crucial to sustaining their power (Verweijen 
2013; see also Raeymaekers 2014). Officers generally maintain particularly close 
patronage ties with civilians from their region of origins and with members of their 
own ethnic group. This became clear during a visit to a village in the Ruzizi Plain 
(Uvira territory), an area plagued by insecurity, where certain army generals having 
family members in the area were said to be very influential, despite having no formal 
																																																								
2
 While Giddens uses the terminology of Òsocial positions,Ó the term Òsocial lcategoriesÓ was deemed 
to better reflect their structural nature.  
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authority there. A cattle-owner of the Banyamulenge group explained: ÒAll our cattle 
has been stolen by the Mai-Mai [generic name for armed groups claiming to engage 
in community defense]. If it was not for General Mustapha (a general in the FARDC 
from the same ethnic group), we wouldnÕt even be able to live here.Ó Entering into 
protection arrangements with armed actors occurs on a very large scale, not least 
owing to the fact that significant segments of the population are exposed to physical 
insecurity and depend on economic activities facilitated by patronage for their 
livelihood. Moreover, due to its long lineage, maintaining patronage ties has become 
an institutionalized practice, which follows well-established informal rules and is 
sometimes highly routinized (Verweijen 2015a).  
The second social category that strongly informs social role performance 
within civil-military interaction is that of Òstate agents,Ó which is linked to the 
polyvalent concept of Òstateness.Ó In relation to the military, ÒstatenessÓ may, for 
instance, refer to an idealized notion of Òthe militaryÓ as a constitutionally mandated 
provider of public security, charged with defending the countryÕs territorial integrity, 
and protecting civilians (Verweijen 2015a).  This notion was clearly invoked by the 
FARDC officers seeking support from the humanitarian field base manager described 
above. At this abstract level, the military is linked to the idea(l) of Òthe state,Ó 
whichÑdespite the malfunctioning of its actual embodimentÑcontinues to be central 
to imaginaries of political order in the Congo (Englebert 2003). At a less abstract 
level, the military is associated with its historical modus operandi of deterrence, or the 
occasional display of disproportionate and at times arbitrary force, in vogue since the 
colonial era (Schatzberg 1988). Consequently, there is a latent distrust towards the 
FARDC, which prompts civilians to keep their distance. In the words of a village 
elder: ÒWe collaborate closely, but with a lot of cautionÓ [avec beaucoup de reserves]. 
A woman trading in cigarettes put it as follows: ÒEven when they are our neighbors, 
we still do not fully trust them.Ó Aside from being associated with the possibility of 
brutal violence, the military in the Congo is also seen in relation to the stateÕs 
parasitic tendency to live off the populationÕs back through all types of Òtaxation,Ó 
service fees, and extortion (Trefon 2009). While these forms of state extraction are 
essentially based on coercion, many have become routinized and are quasi-official. 
This latter category includes: demanding free rides from civilian transport operators 
(especially on trucks and boats), house-to-house collections of bunga (cassava or 
maize flour), market taxation, and the navyÕs appropriation of a part of fishermenÕs 
catch (Verweijen 2015a).  
In addition to patronage and stateness, a third social category that informs the 
FARDCÕs interactions with civilians is that of Òin/out-group,Ó seen either in terms of 
autochthony or ethnicity. Autochthony relates to claim of being the original, first 
inhabitants of an area, as opposed to foreigners or newcomers. It may overlap with 
ethnicity, when foreigners are defined in ethnic terms (Geschiere 2009). Similar to 
ethnicity, the elevated socio-political significance of autochthony is largely an 
outgrowth of colonial-era policies of indirect rule, and postcolonial leadersÕ 
engagement in identity politics (Hoffmann 2014). Both notions of belonging continue 
to be heavily drawn upon in political and armed mobilization today, having been 
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among the main narratives framing conflict since the start of the 1990s (Jackson 
2003). In the Kivus, these narratives tend to pit self-styled ÒautochthonousÓ groups 
against ÒRwandophonesÓ or speakers of Kinyarwanda (the language also spoken in 
neighboring Rwanda). The latter are framed as Ò(Rwandan) immigrantsÓ and 
Òforeigners,Ó who are not Òauthentic CongoleseÓ (Verweijen 2015b). Autochthony 
and ethnicity also shape civilian-military interaction, in particular when the military 
associates civilians with armed groups from a similar ethnic background, or where 
patronage networks with an ethnic component dominate particular military units or 
structures (Verweijen 2015a; 2018). This last scenario was in place between 2009 and 
2012, when a Rwandophone rebel group that had integrated into the FARDC in 2009 
dominated the armyÕs command structures in the Kivus. As a result, the old joke that 
FARDC stands for Forces Armes Rwandaises en RD Congo [Rwandan Armed 
Forces in the DR Congo] regained currency, reflecting the extent to which civilians 
perceive the military through the lens of autochthony (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 
2013).  
Conflicts coded as relating to social belonging generally overlap with other 
conflicts, like those over land ownership and use, local governance, and access to 
scarce resources. Other conflicts that are frequent in the Kivus are less often seen 
through the lens of autochthony or ethnicity, like family-related and personal disputes 
over dowry, children and love affairs. Whether having an identity dimension or not, 
due to deficient mechanisms of conflict regulation, including state-led justice, it is 
exceedingly difficult to resolve disputes in the Kivus (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 
2014). Unresolved conflicts generate considerable insecurity, adding to the many 
other factors that render everyday life precarious. In particular the enduring condition 
of economic scarcity weighs heavily, forcing many people to engage in a permanent 
struggle for survival, while also feeding into conflicts and competition.  
As we have seen, to overcome these challenges, and secure oneÕs life, family, 
property and income, people solicit protection from patrons, including officers in the 
military. While intended to overcome insecurity, however, protection mechanisms 
generate considerable conflicts and insecurity themselves. They nourish fierce and 
ongoing competition among both providers and solicitors of protection. For instance, 
within the FARDC, there is significant rivalry between different patronage networks, 
which may lead one faction to outcompete the other in terms of extorting civilians 
(Verweijen 2015a). Moreover, in particular when involving armed actors, patronage 
relations foster the use of coercion for social regulation, like for settling disputes, 
countering opponents and gaining economic and political advantage. Hence, the very 
responses people develop to deal with conflicts and insecurity create further conflicts 
and insecurity, which in turn fuel an increased demand for protection (Verweijen 
2013, 2015a).  In this manner, dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection become 
self-enforcing. Due to their importance as protection providers, these dynamics 
crucially underpin the dominance of armed actors, including in non-security-related 
spheres of social life. Following Thee (1980), I call the processes through which this 
dominance is created and sustained Òmilitarization,Ó describing social-structural 
transformations in at once power relations, norms and discourses.  As stipulated by 
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the theory of structuration, these militarized social structures shape social agentsÕ 
practices.  In this manner, they set in motion the self-enforcing dynamics of conflict, 
insecurity and protection described above, which are at the root of the instability of 
the social environment. In the following, it is further demonstrated how these 
entwined structures and dynamics shape civilian resistance to the military.  
Repertoires of Civilian Resistance to the Military 
 
Despite widespread compliance with army personnelÕs demands and regular 
collaboration (Verweijen 2013, 2015a), Kivutians from all layers of the population 
frequently resist the military in variegated manners. By far the most common form of 
resistance is individual, unorganized, everyday acts of contention, including those that 
some would label Òself-interested,Ó as they center on immediate material gain or the 
direct avoidance of material loss. Similar to Scott (1985), I consider such efforts to 
ensure socio-economic safety resistance nonetheless, since they counter the material 
and symbolic claims of the military. A second form, which is less frequently 
encountered, is collective, public acts of resistance, which may be either spontaneous, 
like mob justice targeting soldiers, or organized, such as manifestations and strikes. A 
third form relates to targeted efforts by professionals (e.g. local authorities, 
businesspeople) to change the militaryÕs practices. These efforts may be either mostly 
to the advantage of their own faction or constituency (e.g. lower ÒtaxesÓ for a specific 
group of businesspeople only) or benefit the population as a whole (e.g. dismantling 
road blocks). In the following, these three forms of resistance are further elucidated 
by means of examples from the fieldwork.  
 
Everyday Micro-Resistance 
 
Everyday practices of resistance to the military are embedded in the daily flow of 
activities, and are therefore shaped by routines (cf. Giddens 1984). One practice 
where the effects of routines can clearly be observed is bargaining to reduce the price 
of fees, ÒtaxesÓ and fines imposed by the military. Due to the long-standing parasitic 
tendencies of the Congolese state apparatus, bargaining with state agents has become 
an engrained social practice that follows widely known but informal norms (Bilakila 
2004; Trefon 2009). Aside from informal norms, civiliansÕ bargaining performance is 
generally shaped by their social and political capital, their bargaining acumen, and the 
unfolding dynamic of the interaction, which carries an extra risk when soldiers are 
armed and intoxicated. When passing a military roadblock on the back of a 
motorcycle, a soldier whose breath betrayed the consumption of kanyanga (a local 
brew made of cassava and maize waste) imposed an extra fee of 200 Francs 
congolais (FC), on top of the usual 500 FC.3 When I started to protest, my motard 
[motor-taxi driver] begged me to stop, whispering in my ear: ÒHe is a drunk. This 
																																																								
3
 200 Francs congolais equals USD 0.13	
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hotheaded fellow may reach for his gun. I have seen such soldiers before. Let us just 
pay and go.Ó This example indicates how this motard, when dealing with a situation 
in the here and now, where in Emirbayer and MischeÕs description the Òpractical-
evaluativeÓ strand of agency dominates, still characterized it Òagainst the background 
of past patterns of experienceÓ (1998, 997). 
But bargaining is not only shaped by past experiences and efforts to minimize 
present risks or seize upon direct opportunities; it is also influenced by estimations of 
how dangerous or useful a certain soldier, officer or military unit will be in the future. 
The importance of future danger was evidenced by often-heard statements like ÒThe 
military never forgets,Ó or ÒThe military can always return to take revenge one day.Ó 
When waiting at the parking of the town of Kirumba (North Kivu) for the departure of 
the big truck in which I had secured a place in the cabin to travel to Kiwanja, I 
observed how a soldier approached the driver to ask for a place on top of the cargo, 
where passengers paying a small fee are commonly piled up. However, the driver had 
already accepted five soldiers to travel on top of his truck for free, the maximum 
according to unwritten conventions. Not intimidated by the soldierÑas reflected in 
his body languageÑhe initially refused. But after haggling over it for a while, he 
eventually accepted. When I asked for the reasons of his decision, he replied:  ÒYou 
never know, maybe you once end up in a situation where this soldier is the only one 
to help you,Ó emphasizing that he often passed isolated stretches of road, where 
ambushes are frequent.  
In addition to social practices like bargaining, everyday resistance also takes 
the form of speech acts, like jokes, gossip, rumors, tales and allegories. Such acts 
generally serve to ridicule and desecrate the powerful, symbolically invert power 
relations, undo official rhetoric, or foment dissent (Scott 1990). Civilians in the Kivus 
use the full range of this discursive repertoire to comment on, cope with, and contest 
the oppressive weight of military extraction and abuses (Verweijen 2015a). One 
particular frequent speech act of resistance is talking negatively about the FARDC on 
radio trottoir [pavement radio], described by Ellis (1989) as a rumor-mill discussing 
matters of public interest or concern on which official information is lacking or found 
suspicious. Radio trottoir broadcasts particularly frantically within the feverish 
atmosphere of war zones. As observed by Jackson (2003, 195): Ò[W]here certainty is 
in short supply, but desperately craved, meaning is manufactured, resulting in an 
Ôeconomy of truth-makingÕ in Kivu.Ó In such circumstances, people often cling to 
versions of ÒrealityÓ that confirm their existing worldviews and forms of (collective) 
identification. Thus, in areas predominantly inhabited by self-styled Òautochthones,Ó 
rumors harming the FARDC are sooner spread when the locally deployed unit is 
dominated by Rwandophones, with the blame specifically ascribed to that group.  
One area where this mechanism was found to be at work was the Ngandja 
sector of Fizi (in South Kivu), where the Mai-Mai group of Yakotumba has a strong 
influence (Verweijen 2015b). When arriving in Misisi, a town in Ngandja close to an 
artisanal gold mining site, in January 2010, I was lodged in a guesthouse owned by 
civil society organizations that was located on the outskirts of town, next to a military 
camp. The place was deserted, not only as it had been occupied by military officers, 
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but also, as I came to learn, as it was reportedly the site of a mass grave. At the end of 
2009, I was told, an FARDC brigade consisting primarily of Rwandophones was 
deployed to the Misisi area to conduct operations against the Mai-Mai. On November 
29, 2009, an angry mob composed in majority of motor-taxi drivers gathered in front 
of this brigadeÕs headquarters. Their main demand was that the military hand over the 
suspected perpetrator of the murder of one of their colleagues, with the purpose of 
killing him to take revenge. When the mob repeatedly refused to obey the FARDCÕs 
orders to evacuate the premises, the military opened fire. According to civil society 
actors attending the event, local civilian authorities and health care centers in the 
surroundings, four people were killed on the spot and 17 others were wounded, one of 
whom was documented to have died afterwards. However, many other people I 
contacted, including shopkeepers, artisanal miners, and members of local NGOs, 
spoke of a large-scale massacre with dozens of victims, who were reportedly buried 
near my guesthouse. When trying to establish the reasons for these diverging 
narratives, I came to the conclusion that the alleged mass graves functioned as a 
symbol of the atrocities committed by Rwandophone troops, even while the 
commanding officer during the massacre had not been a Rwandophone. Propaganda 
spread by the Mai-Mai corroborated this reading. On February 5, 2011, the Mai-Mai 
Yakotumba issued a political statement in which they denounced the mass atrocities 
committed by Rwandophone troops in Fizi, alluding to the Ò60 deathsÓ of the 
Òmassacre of MisisiÓ (Mai Mai Reform 2011). While it remains unclear what role 
the Mai-Mai group and its supporters played in inflating the body count, it is obvious 
that autochthony discourses heavily colored the telling and retelling of the story of the 
massacre. This story thus illustrates how rumors on the FARDC, as a form of 
everyday resistance, are shaped by existing grids of intelligibility, or in GiddensÕs 
terminology Òstructures of signification.Ó  
 
Collective Public Protest  
 
While less often than individualized everyday resistance, civilians in the Kivus also 
engage in collective public protest, which occurs either organized or spontaneously. 
Spontaneous protest is commonly provoked by particular incidents, like murders or 
arrests by the military seen as unjust. In rare cases, such spontaneous resistance takes 
the form of justice populaire [mob or popular justice], whereby civilians collectively 
attempt to kill a soldier, for instance, by burning them alive (Verweijen 2015c). 
Justice populaire against soldiers mostly occurs in environments where the military is 
held responsible for insecurity experienced as excessive, and civilians catch an 
alleged perpetrator of crime. This was a common scenario in the town of Kirumba. In 
2009, the FARDC established operational headquarters there, leading to a large influx 
of military personnel, most of who moved to civilian residential areas. The 
omnipresence of ill supervised service members contributed to a spike in robberies, 
burglary, murders and forms of violent score-settling, whereby FARDC soldiers act as 
Òguns for hireÓ (see Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2014). Sustained efforts by the 
town authorities to address the situationÑlike registering all military living in civilian 
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areas, or forcing them to live in the military campÑfailed to bring change. As the 
chef de cit [town authority] told meÑon the verge of desperationÑafter a meeting 
with the FARDC command to which he had invited me: ÒYou see, all the agreements 
made here today, they will simply never implement them.Ó Aside from a lack of will, 
he explained, this was also a result of frequent rotations, as incoming commanders 
refuse to respect agreements made by their predecessors.  
The frustration about the military that was building up in Kirumba created a 
fertile climate for justice populaire, as evidenced by a string of incidents that occurred 
after my departure. People with whom I had stayed in touch informed me about these 
events by phone.  On July 8, 2011, an FARDC soldier was found on the terrain of a 
private house in the Birere quarter, with the clear intention of burglary.  Outraged, the 
quarterÕs inhabitants immediately decapitated him. On September 23, 2011, yet 
another incident of mob justice occurred, when civilians recognized a soldier who had 
committed an armed robbery in the neighborhood one month earlier, and stoned him 
to death (Yotama 2011). As corroborated by research into justice populaire that I 
conducted in other areas (Verweijen 2015c), when targeting soldiers, this practice has 
characteristics of two types of crowds identified by Canetti: first, a Òbaiting crowdÓ 
(1984, 49), which attempts to kill a Òbait;Ó and second, due to the symbolism attached 
to attacking a soldier, a Òreversal crowd,Ó Òwhose discharge consists mainly in its 
collective deliverance from the stings of commandÓ (1984, 59). In this case, the 
involved reversal goes even further: it also relates to civiliansÕ usurping of the 
militaryÕs command over life and death and its role of Òpublic security provider.Ó 
Thus, this form of resistance is deeply shaped by structures of legitimation and 
signification relating to Òstateness;Ó not only is it the norm-violating behavior of a 
state agent that triggers the protest in the first place, the act of resistance itself draws 
upon prerogatives and duties that are officially the exclusive domain of Òthe state.Ó 
A second form of collective public protests is of a more organized kind. Such 
orchestrated contentious action rarely takes the form of manifestations in the streets. 
Instead, citizens in the Kivus prefer to hold a general strike, called ville morte [dead 
city]. During such days, shops do not open, no markets are held, motor-taxi drivers 
and other transport operators do not move; civil society organizations do not open the 
doors of their offices; and, in some cases, schools and administrative offices close as 
well. The ville morte came to fruition as a protest tactic during the rowdy early 1990s, 
when the political opposition fought to dislodge the autocratic regime of Mobutu Sese 
Seko, who had been in power since 1965. The tactic was developed in part to avoid 
the extreme violence by which previous protest marches had been suppressed. For De 
Villers and Omasombo  (2004, 146), the ville morte therefore reveals Òmore despair 
and collective impotence than constructive political mobilization.Ó Yet, it does send a 
potent signal of discontent.  
Due to the low risks involvedÑcompared to taking to the streetsÑthe ville 
morte is a popular channel to protest the performance of the security services. For 
example, in March 2010, the platform of local civil society organizations organized a 
ville morte in the town of Kasindi, on the border between North Kivu and Uganda. In 
order to maximize the effects, the organizing committee composed a list of detailed 
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demands to the local authorities, like rotating personnel from the civilian and military 
intelligence services, and the release of several people unlawfully held in military 
detention. However, none of these demands were honored. As one human rights 
activist who had helped organize the strike told me, about a month after the ville 
morte had taken place: ÒUp to today this strike has remained without impact [sans 
suite]. Immediately after, these [security] services disappeared for a while, but they 
have all returned here.Ó  Moreover, soon after their return, arbitrary arrests and 
extortion continued at more or less the same level as before.  
One reason for the limited effects of the ville morte is that they tend to be of 
limited duration. The majority of Kivutians cannot afford to be involved in protest 
actions that paralyze economic life for a long time. Cultivators have to work their 
fields and sell their produce; day laborers and petty traders can barely survive when 
missing more than one day of income; and people cannot stop providing for basic 
necessities, like fetching water and firewood. These circumscribed possibilities for 
sustained engagement reduce the effectiveness of strikes, as authorities anticipate they 
will not last long. Together with the fear for repression described above, these socio-
economic constraints indicate how what Giddens (1984) describes as Òstructures of 
domination,Ó relating to the asymmetric distribution of allocative and authoritative 
resources, strongly shape not only civiliansÕ repertoires of contention but also the 
effects of that contention. 
 
Professional Practices of Contestation  
 
Particular professional groups, like civilian authorities, human rights defenders, and 
economic operators, often take targeted action to resist the FARDCÕs practices and 
power. They may, for instance, advocate the dismantling of roadblocks, demand 
apologies, reparations, and the punishment of perpetrators, orÑlike the chef de cit of 
KirumbaÑask for service members to be removed from civilian residential areas. The 
ways in which such sensitive issues are brought up with the military are highly varied, 
and encompass both formal and informal, direct and indirect channels. As with street 
action, public denunciations, like radio broadcasts, are risky, as they may lead to 
retaliations and intimidation. In the highly insecure Binza area in Rutshuru (North 
Kivu), I spoke to a local radio journalist, who only wanted to talk behind closed 
doors. He feared being seen with a white person, since the military might think I was 
a human rights investigator. After checking once more whether the curtains were well 
closed, he explained: ÒWe made a radio broadcast about soldiers who cut bunches of 
bananas from the trees and then force civilians to transport them to their camp. After 
that, they [the military] followed that journalist [who made the broadcast] and 
threatened him with death. We are now very careful in discussing security issues in 
our programs.Ó Human rights defenders often face similar intimidation. Moreover, 
aside from having to deal with immediate threats, they also anticipate danger at a later 
stage. In particular, they fear that perpetrators will take revenge on those who helped 
getting them behind bars. A human rights defender in Fizi said: ÒThe problem is that I 
can denounce him [the perpetrator] today. But tomorrow he is back in the village. 
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And who is going to pay for that?Ó These fears are well founded in the light of the 
porosity of prisons in the Congo, where detainees easily escape through prison breaks 
or corruption. As several of my interlocutors emphasized, the fact that civilians and 
military live intermingled makes things worse, as one can never completely hide from 
the military or stay anonymous. Hence, even when direct intimidation is limited, those 
pressing for change tend to impose self-censorship with an eye to future threats. In 
such cases, the projective, future-oriented strand of agency clearly dominates. Yet as 
the generalized fear for revenge from prison escapees shows, within such forms of 
projectivity, possible trajectories are still Òlocated against a backdrop of prior 
typifications from experienceÓ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 988).  
Self-censorship often induces the adoption of more discreet channels of 
protest. Local authorities may for instance choose to address letters to their hierarchy, 
instead of directly confronting the locally deployed army commander, or challenge 
the military in informal settings, like face-to-face meetings behind closed doors. Such 
informal contentious action tends to be shaped by patronage logics, as those seeking 
change attempt to harness existing contacts in the military, asking them to follow up 
on a particular issue as a ÒfavorÓ within broader relations of exchange.  These forms 
of non-public action are less confrontational, and allow people to not openly advocate 
their position. Making public statements can be particularly inconvenient where oneÕs 
behavior contradicts oneÕs professed principles. In the town of Uvira (South Kivu), a 
ship-owner told me during an interview that he was infuriated by the FARDCÕs 
practice to impose a fixed number of soldiers travelling for free on his ships over 
Lake Tanganyika (due to the militaryÕs lack of transport). When trying to protest this 
practice, as member of the ship-ownersÕ association, he approached an officer high up 
in the military hierarchy that he knew very well, as he originates from the same area 
of Uvira territory, and they had grown up together. At the same time, according to 
multiple sources, this businessman was widely known to collaborate with the FARDC 
naval forces to illegally import goods over the lake. One can therefore imagine he 
preferred to refrain from making public statements on the FARDCÕs malpractices, 
rather trying to reduce the imposed number of soldiers travelling on his ships by using 
his personal contacts within the military discreetly. Allegedly, this businessman also 
harnessed his collaboration with the navy to harass competing ship-owners, whose 
passengers and cargo were, as a result, frequently subjected to extensive controls in 
the harbor. This competition might have been another reason why he preferred 
individual informal channels to address the issue of free transportation, instead of 
building a broader coalition among ship-owners, even though he professed to act in 
his capacity of member of the ship-ownersÕ association. Indeed, it is a recurring 
practice that civilians consider it more in their interest to liaise with certain factions in 
the FARDC to defeat (civilian) competitors than to collaborate with their colleagues 
to push back the militaryÕs overall influence (Verweijen 2013, 2015a).  
The case of the ship-owner in Uvira shows the ambivalent effects of civilian-
military conviviality and concomitant shared intimate knowledge. On the one hand, 
close contacts, in this case the ship-ownerÕs relation to an army officer he had grown 
up with, facilitated his approaching the military to express discontent. One can also 
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imagine how intimate knowledge, like knowing secrets of this particular officerÕs 
past, could have further helped the ship-owner to mobilize the officer for his cause. 
On the other hand, other close contacts, namely the ship-ownerÕs relation with the 
navy, prevented him from taking a more overt confrontational stance. Moreover, the 
navyÕs intimate knowledge of the ship-ownerÕs engagement in illegal practices 
rendered him vulnerable to pressures to give up his efforts to protest certain military 
practices. Since in this case, civilian-military intimacy stemmed to a large extent from 
patronage relations, the boat-operatorÕs actions also further reveal the imprint of the 
social structures constitutive of patronage on social practice. In particular, they show 
how patronage logics and relations induce seeming inconsistencies in civiliansÕ 
behavior towards the military, leading simultaneously or alternately to conflict and 
collaboration.  
 
Analyzing Civilian Resistance and its Effects 
 
The above discussion of repertoires of civilian resistance against the FARDC 
demonstrates how these repertoires are shaped by at once the unsettledness of the 
KivusÕ socio-political order and durable social structures. Considerable volatility and 
uncertainty prompt civilians to seize upon present opportunities to express discontent 
with the military and reduce or avoid its negative impacts on their lives and 
livelihoods, while factoring in immediate risks. At the same time, and as further 
prompted by the complex interweaving of civilian and military lives, contentious 
action is generally performed with an eye to reducing future threats and enlarging 
future opportunities. Yet these efforts to navigate the present while keeping an eye on 
the future are strongly shaped by prior experiences, engrained patterns of thought and 
action, and socio-economic constraints, or in other words, social structures. For 
instance, both anticipated repression and patronage logics make people avoid public 
protest and seek more private channels for articulating opposition instead. When 
trying to reduce the extent of extractive claims placed upon them by the military, 
civilians draw upon routines of bargaining developed in the course of decades of 
parasitic statehood. And when articulating resistance, civiliansÕ narratives may be 
shaped by deeply rooted discourses of autochthony, leading them to single out 
Rwandophone soldiers as the main culprits.  
It follows that the analytical lens of social navigation, with its attention to how 
unsettled environments shape thoughts and action in and towards the socially 
immediate and the socially imagined, does not suffice for comprehending the ways in 
which civilians in the Kivus resist the military. Rather, we also need to look at how 
resistance and its expressions are enabled and constrained by social structures. Scott 
(1985) adopts a similar approach, analyzing how the nature of peasant resistance is 
influenced by structural factors like existing forms of labor control, the parameters of 
repression, shared worldviews and values, and social stratification and networks 
shaped by class and kinship. Yet contrary to what is observed by Scott, in the Kivus, 
an overall penchant for forms of everyday, individualized and non-public forms of 
resistance does not only stem from beliefs about the likelihood and intensity of 
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repression. It also results from the salience of patronage logics, as well as the desireÑ
characteristic of social navigationÑto keep as many future options open as possible 
(Vigh 2009), an ambition that is undermined by open confrontations. It is precisely in 
this attention to how people contemplate charting future paths through flux, and how 
these contemplations inform their current actions, that social navigation provides 
added value. Moreover, it usefully highlights how social practice in fluid situations is 
shaped by the multiplicity of social networks that people are embedded in and the 
multiple social roles that they enact, rendering their paths of action versatile and 
multi-pronged.  
 
Attending to intersecting social roles and networks is of particular importance 
for comprehending civilian resistance to the military in the Kivus. The multifaceted 
entanglement of civilian and military lives renders the boundaries between public vs. 
private, civilian vs. military and state vs. non-state elastic and occasionally irrelevant. 
In this context of civilian-military intimacy, it is difficult to qualify less public 
manifestations of civilian resistance as Òhidden transcriptsÓ (Scott 1990), since they 
are often performed in co-presence of members of the military. Furthermore, as the 
case of the ship-owner in Uvira demonstrates, intimate and intersecting civilian-
military contacts, and the resulting blurred lines between ÒpublicÓ and Òprivate,Ó 
render resistance fleeting and unstable. Since contestation in one area affects practices 
in another, like when public protest has ramifications in the private sphere or vice 
versa, fluctuations in attitudes and behavior are a frequent occurrence.  
Another factor that undermines the development of stable and coherent 
collective civilian opposition to the military is the relative weakness of the 
superordinate identity category of ÒciviliansÓ: People in the Kivus define themselves 
only occasionally as ÒciviliansÓ with common interests vis--vis Òthe military.Ó When 
I asked the owner of a house how she felt about an officer renting a room there, she 
replied that she was bothered by it, since he was months behind on the rent. Yet, she 
did not engage in protest. According to a shopkeeper living in the same street, this 
woman refrained from actionÑdespite the missed incomeÑas this allowed her to 
harness the officer to intimidate her neighbor, with whom she had a long-standing 
conflict. For the same reason, she refused to participate in an initiative by the chef de 
quartier [low-level urban authority] to compile a list of all homeowners victim of 
arrears of rent and hand it over to the military authorities. In sum, especially when 
combined with high levels of conflict among civilians and weak collective civilian 
identification, a context of civilian-military intimacy undermines collective 
contentious action. Not only may it lead civilians, like the homeowner, to forego 
resistance altogether, it also induces a preference for informal, personalized forms of 
contention.  
Using informal, personal channels of protest further compounds the collective 
action problems that civilians commonly face when trying to resist armed actors (cf. 
Arjona 2014). Informal channels have less of a signaling function, in that dissent 
remains hidden to a wider audience. This invisibility affects beliefs in the possibility 
of generalized opposition, which would render contestation both more efficacious and 
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less risky for individual actors. Moreover, informal forms of protest induce a 
particularistic orientation, as they increase the chance that people primarily try to 
further their and their factionÕs own interests rather than ensure collective benefits. 
This chance is already substantial given the utilitarian mindset fostered by volatility 
and acute economic, political and physical insecurity: Where events unfold in 
unpredictable manners and long-term collective benefits are far from guaranteed, it is 
tempting to ensure immediate personal gains. Utilitarian and patronage rationalities 
may also prompt civilians to primarily contest the temporary dominance of certain 
military factions or commanders, including by harnessing the latterÕs rivals in the 
military, instead of trying to structurally reduce the militaryÕs overall power. 
Collaborating with some military networks to contest others risks merely changing 
temporary power equilibriums within the armed forces, instead of permanently 
altering the balance of power between military and civilians. 
 
It follows that to understand the effects of resistance on the social order we 
must examine two dimensions: first, how contentious action affects fluid and volatile 
dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection, and second, how such dynamics in 
turn impact durable social structures. To give an example, the rumors about the 
ÒMisisi massacreÓ fuelled antagonism towards Rwandophones, which in turn 
bolstered the local Mai-Mai group using this antagonism as a mobilizing narrative. 
Yet this groupÕs increased prominence prompted an intensification of FARDC 
operations against them, which ultimately further entrenched the militaryÕs power in 
the area (Verweijen 2015a). Similarly, by creating fear for revenge from the military, 
justice populaire targeting soldiers may drive people to solicit protection from other 
parts of the military. In addition, it contributes to the normalization and 
ÒdemocratizationÓ of violence in the long term (Verweijen 2015c). The result might 
be a larger role for the FARDC in either effectuating or stemming that violence, and 
will therefore likely reinforce its power position. In sum, civilian resistance often 
intensifies the very dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection that underpin the 
FARDCÕs position of dominance, thus contributing to entrenching, rather than 
undermining, the militarization of the Kivus. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Drawing on extensive ethnographic field research in the eastern CongoÕs Kivu 
provinces, this article has shown the twin relevance of social navigation and 
structuration for understanding the ways in which civilians resist the national armed 
forces, and the effects of this resistance in terms of challenging the militaryÕs 
dominance. While social navigation usefully draws attention to how social practice is 
influenced by ever-changing and precarious environments, it appears to overlook the 
imprint of past patterns thought and action. In fact, it may be precisely in situations of 
high flux and uncertainty that prior experiences and existing typificationsÑproviding 
clear points of anchorage amidst rapid change, uncertainty and opacityÑcome to 
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inform not only current social practice, but also imaginations of the future. 
Additionally, despite its emphasis on radical interactivity, social navigation cannot 
fully account for the effects of social practices on social orders. Immediate effects on 
fluid social constellations might not always translate into permanent transformations 
of the social structures that shape these constellations. Hence, instead of 
conceptualizing the social environment in a monolithic manner, a distinction should 
be made between on the one hand, fluid dynamics, and on the other hand, durable 
social structures, which both shape and are shaped by these fluid dynamics.  
Such a distinction can clearly be discerned within KivutiansÕ temporal 
orientations and their professed beliefs in their own agentic possibilities. In many of 
my interlocutorsÕ discourses, perceptions of hyper-fluidity were palpable, and 
coincided with feelings of having a limited grip on the situation. These feelings were 
particularly strong in areas that frequently change hands between the government and 
different rebel forces, or those with rapid rotations of FARDC units, forcing civilians 
to negotiate and cope each time with different armed actors. A local authority in Fizi 
territory commented:  
 
Military deployment is like a game of chance. If you have good luck, 
they send you intellectuals. If you have bad luck, they send you 
bandits, and you have perpetual confrontations. But each time they 
change, you have to start from zero.  
 
Notwithstanding this experienced volatility, civilians in the Kivus also display an 
elevated awareness of the social orderÕs fixity. They are particularly conscious of the 
militaryÕs stable position of dominance, which renders it difficult to discern the 
effects of individual efforts to challenge it. As one human rights defender in Lubero 
territory commented: ÒToday I can follow up on this case [of illegal detention by the 
military] and liberate him [the detainee]. But tomorrow they arrest someone else, and 
we have to start all over (É). This discourages us.Ó 
In sum, when conceptualizing resistance in volatile settings, we should take 
into account that Òactors are always simultaneously located in a variety of temporal-
relational contexts at onceÓ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 1008), some of which are 
more and some of which are less fluid. But merely differentiating between these 
contexts does not suffice: How these divergent temporal-relational environments 
inter-relate, and are mutually implicated in shaping agency, should also be analyzed. 
Conducting such analysis is particularly important for understanding militarization as 
a process of structuration: It is only by recognizing how fluid dynamics of conflict, 
insecurity and protection imprint civiliansÕ practicesÑincluding their repertoires of 
resistance against the militaryÑthat we can understand how such fluidity both 
contributes to and is a product of the (re)production of militarized social structures 
over the longue dure.  
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